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Introduction 
Most new drugs are protected by pharmaceutical patents, which give the patent holder exclusive control 
over that drug’s supply for 20 years. When the patent term expires, the drug becomes available for 
generic production by any company. The resulting competition typically leads to dramatic reductions in 
price. In Brazil, generic drugs are on average 40% cheaper than reference or brand-name drugs.1 In the 
United States, the Federal Drug Administration reports up to 85% price differences.2 Consumers in India 
have witnessed more than 100-fold price reduction for antiretroviral (ARV) drugs due to generic 
production.3 Generics thus play a key role in broadening access to health care, mostly by driving costs 
down, both in the developing and developed world. 
  
Yet access to generic medicines often depends on a country’s ability to import them. Widely known as 
“the pharmacy of the developing world,”4 India exports 67% of its drugs production to developing 
countries that either cannot produce any drugs or whose local production is not enough to meet local 
needs. India and China are also the world’s main suppliers of active ingredients--the raw material for 
drug production--that support the generic drug industries of several other countries, including Brazil. As 
will be shown below, even for large countries with a strong and established generic industry, 
importation channels are essential to making these drugs available. This makes the supply of generic 
drugs vulnerable to new “border measures” restricting the transshipment of such drugs through some 
European countries. 
  
Between 2008 and 2009, Dutch authorities confiscated several shipments of generic drugs bound for 
various developing countries in South America and Africa.5 Most of the drugs were produced in India, 
and were seized on suspicion of patent and trademark infringement. The shipments contained generic 
versions of drugs originally developed by large pharmaceutical companies, such as Pfizer and Novartis, 
who still held patent rights in the European Union.6 These drugs were not protected by patent in India, 
however, nor in any of the destination countries for which they were bound. After they were seized, 
some of the shipments were destroyed, some were returned to India, and a few were eventually allowed 
to continue on to their destinations.7 
  
Negotiations over at least two new international treaties have sought to expand this practice by 
mandating border enforcement of intellectual property protections.8 As a growing number of countries 
consider such measures, pharmaceutical exporters have a new problem on their hands. Small producers, 
in particular, may be unable to sustain the financial and legal risks of having their shipments seized. 
Drug costs may also rise as exporters turn to less efficient shipping routes in order to minimize border 
risks. As a result, access to essential medicines will be diminished across the developing world. 
  
From a human rights perspective, this new threat to public health poses unique challenges. International 
human rights law traditionally imagines human rights violations in a primarily national paradigm: each 
government is responsible for respecting and protecting rights within its own territory. In the case of 
generic drug seizures in foreign ports, however, human rights are being threatened by the actions of a 
foreign government. The traditional mechanisms and institutions of state accountability may therefore 
be inadequate to address this uniquely transnational harm. 
  
In addition, international human rights law remains quite unsure of how to handle the tension between 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines. There is no legal consensus as to whether health should 
come before patents, or vice versa, or where the appropriate balance between the two legal regimes lies. 
The reigning compromise has been to permit each country substantial flexibility and autonomy in 
striking the right balance within its own territory. Yet is precisely this compromise that is challenged by 
the new trend toward intellectual property enforcement at transit points. If allowed to stand, border 
enforcement of pharmaceutical patents will effectively allow European countries of transit to set higher 
standards for protection than the destination countries would have chosen for themselves. 
  
This article explores these legal and ethical tensions through the particular experience of Brazil. A 
country of great income inequality, Brazil has succeeded in making drugs broadly available largely 
because of generic availability. Yet this supply is now at risk due to the political vulnerability of 
European importation channels, through the new trend of “border enforcement” of intellectual property. 
This phenomenon requires new scrutiny of the relationship between intellectual property, international 
trade, and the human right to health. The article first demonstrates the vulnerability of the Brazilian 
public health system to disruptions of international trade in pharmaceutical compounds. It then explores 
how international legal institutions might address the unique human rights dimensions of this particular 
trade dispute. 
  
Drug Production in Brazil 
Brazil has garnered worldwide recognition for its public health system.9 Based on the 1988 
constitutional recognition of health as a fundamental right, the Brazilian Public Health System (Sistema 
Único de Saúde - SUS) offers comprehensive medical coverage to Brazil’s 190 million citizens.10 The 
publicly funded system provides universal access to medical services as well as most drugs needed for 
treatment, at no charge to the patient. Therefore, the use of similar and generic drugs has long been 
essential to the Ministry of Health’s strategy of access to medicines, both through importation and local 
production. A brief look at certain aspects of the Brazilian dynamics of access to health, intellectual 
property rights, and pharmaceutical production may help the reader see the bigger picture. 
  
From 1971 to 1996, Brazil did not offer patent protection for chemical-pharmaceutical products and 
processes. In practice, this meant that branded drugs could be copied and sold domestically by any 
company. Until the late 1990s, two types of drugs were available in the Brazilian market: branded and 
similar.11 However, several significant legal and policy changes impacted Brazil’s drug industry in the 
late 1990s. When the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established, patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products became mandatory under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This significantly limited similar producers’ scope of drug 
production, as patent rights now made it illegal for them to copy the drugs that were released from there 
on. 
  
Credibility was another major problem similar drugs faced. In a successful attempt to address this issue 
(among others), in 1999, Brazil’s Law n. 9-787 (The Generic Statute) defined new rules for generic 
production, which helped assure the population that high quality-low cost medicines were available on 
the market. Unlike similar drugs, generics are entirely interchangeable with reference drugs, the 
bioequivalence process being supervised by The Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency 
(Agência Nacional de Vigilancia Sanitária - ANVISA). A strong governmental campaign launched in 
1999 promoting the safety and efficacy of generic drugs was the final trigger to a successful launch. On 
top of that, strong incentives to the local generic industry were channeled through the Brazilian Bank for 
Social and Economic Development (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social - 
BNDES).12 From 2000 on, generics slowly but steadily started to gain space and force in the Brazilian 
drug market. 
  
Transnational pharmaceutical companies also started producing generic drugs in Brazil, as they quickly 
identified the growing market potential. Most generic drug production, however, is still done by public 
laboratories and private national companies. National pharmaceutical companies have specialized in 
producing generic versions of branded drugs, supplying over 80% of all generics sold in the Brazilian 
market,13 while public laboratories play a key role in providing these drugs to the public health system. 
In 2010, Farmanguinhos claimed credit for the supply of over 1 billion medicines,14 which reached the 
population at no cost through the public health system. Brazil thus has a uniquely strong generics 
industry today. This industry, however, also has points of vulnerability. 
  
The studies of Gadelha, Quental and Fialho15 and Radaelli et al.16 show that since the 1970s the private 
Brazilian pharmaceutical sector as a whole has been dominated by multinational companies: even 
though in numbers they represent only 20% of the pharmaceutical companies in Brazil, they hold 80% 
of the total market share. One notable feature of the transnational drug companies installed in Brazil, 
however, is the fact that they do not conduct local R&D activities; their local actions consist mainly of 
finalizing, packing, and distributing medicines.17 
  
National companies also invest very little in innovation. When looking at the Brazilian pharmaceutical 
sector, Gadelha, Quental and Fialho18 observe that national technological development is minimal, 
restricted to a very small number of companies and public laboratories. Capanema and Palmeira Filho19 
reach a similar conclusion: there is hardly any local production of new drugs and very little investment 
in R&D. Looking at the local production of new drug technology in Brazil, Rosina20 finds there has been 
little change over the past years: national investments in R&D-- when they exist--are mainly focused on 
the drug-making process, not on the development of new or improved medicines. This makes the 
national pharmaceutical industry as a whole heavily limited to branded drugs whose patents have 
already expired. The Brazilian generics drug industry is thus heavily dependent on the importation of 
innovations from abroad, making the topic of intellectual property regulation a crucial one. 
  
The Brazilian generics market is also dependent on importation of a more concrete nature. Studies report 
that over 80% of active pharmaceutical ingredients used in the local production of generic drugs are 
imported.21 And in some instances, local generic production has not been able to meet public health 
needs, thus requiring the importation of fully manufactured medicines. Research conducted by Antunes 
and Canongia22 confirms this scenario, identifying the main drugs and active ingredients on which the 
country is most heavily dependent. 
  
The case of Efavirenz is emblematic in this sense. In May 2007, the Brazilian government issued a 
compulsory license,23 which allowed for the production and sales of the drug in the country. It was not 
until the end of 2009, however, that local production started.24 For over a year and a half, access to this 
crucial HIV treatment depended on the importation of a generic version from India. As Gadelha and 
Maldonado25 point out, this strong and growing dependency on imports means that national social 
policies are increasingly vulnerable, to an extent that might actually put the population’s well-being at 
serious risk. 
  
Thus, when it comes to drug production, Brazil certainly does not stand on its own two feet, both on the 
innovative and generic fronts. Historically and currently, little is invested in the R&D process that might 
lead to new drugs. And generics production, free from patent protection, remains dependent on either 
active ingredients or pharmaceuticals that are not locally available, but rather imported. International 
trade is thus truly at the heart of the Brazilian public health system. Increasingly, this diagnosis is cause 
for concern. When these channels are threatened, the public health system faces critical shortages of 
important drugs. An inability to rely on generic drugs would also challenge the financial sustainability of 
the public health system over the longer term.26 
  
New Threats to Trade in Generic Drugs 
European Community Regulation No 1383/2003 authorizes border enforcement of intellectual property 
rights in the European Union (EU), empowering customs agents to seize goods where there is suspected 
infringement of intellectual property rights. The rationale behind such action lies in the so-called 
“manufacturing fiction,” according to which drugs passing through customs are treated as if they were 
manufactured in and/or bound for the European country where they are found, instead of merely in 
transit. If in this country the particular product is under patent, then the goods are treated as infringing. 
Initially designed for copyright infringement only,27 the European Union regulation now extends to 
trademarks, patents, and other intellectual property rights,28 thus giving customs agents the ability to 
inspect, detain, and seize goods that arrive at any EU port of entry, even if they are only passing through 
en route to a non-EU destination. This temporary detainment gives the patent rights holder a chance to 
verify infringement, and in some cases threaten the alleged infringer with destruction of the shipment.29 
In most cases, the process has led to the return of the drugs to their country of origin.30 
  
Patent protection has been internationally harmonized to a significant degree by the TRIPs Agreement. 
All WTO members are now required to extend patent protection to pharmaceutical products and 
processes. Nonetheless, the situation may often arise that a particular drug under patent in one country is 
not under patent in another.31 Some countries, including India, chose not to retroactively extend patent 
protection to drugs already on the market when the TRIPs changes took effect.32 Countries also retain 
flexibility as to many aspects of pharmaceutical protection, including precise legal standards for 
reviewing patent applications, as well as the ability to issue compulsory licenses. Finally, patents may 
also be granted erroneously, due to administrative error or unclear legal standards. In such cases, an 
issued patent may be challenged and invalidated in a particular domestic jurisdiction, but perhaps not in 
every jurisdiction for reasons of economy or strategy. Thus, although the broad principles of 
pharmaceutical patent protection are consistent internationally, it may often be the case that a particular 
product may be under patent within the European Union, but off patent elsewhere. The effect of border 
enforcement is to take away this ability of non-EU countries to trade in products that EU countries 
would consider infringing. 
  
There have been several incidents of drug seizures pursuant to EC regulation 1383/2003, but two in 
particular have garnered global media attention. The first was a shipment of generic AIDS medicines 
produced in India and on its way to Nigeria. The drugs were purchased by UNITAID,33 and were not 
patent protected in either India or Nigeria. As it passed through an airport in Amsterdam in 2009, the 
shipment was confiscated by Dutch authorities on suspicion of trademark infringement.34 
  
The second incident involved a large shipment from India to Brazil of the hypertension drug losartan 
potassium. Dutch authorities seized the 500-kilogram shipment in December 2008 and after a 36-day 
delay it was sent back to India.35 Hypertension is one of the main causes of death in Brazil, affecting 
over 10 million people in the country.36 The free distribution of hypertension drugs--among which is 
losartan -- through SUS is, thus, an essential part of its public health policy. 
  
India claims that between 2008 and 2009 at least 19 consignments of generic drugs were seized by 
custom authorities in The Netherlands, “16 of which originated in India.”37 
  
Given the substantial stakes, countries benefitting from international trade in generic medicines are 
seeking to challenge this new practice. In 2009, both India and Brazil argued before the Council for 
TRIPS that the Dutch seizures violated the TRIPS agreement. And in 2010, the same countries38 
requested consultations before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, alleging the repeated seizures of 
generic drugs by European Union customs to be inconsistent with GATT39 and TRIPS40 free trade 
provisions. Asserting substantial trade and public health interests in both consultations, the following 
countries have officially requested to join the discussions: Turkey, China, Japan, Ecuador, and Canada. 
There is no way of predicting what the outcome of both disputes will be like, but the fact that 
proceedings were actually initiated before the WTO is a strong indicator that countries that rely on 
generics in order to promote and protect the right to health are willing to take the necessary steps to 
make sure such trade channels remain free. 
  
Unfortunately, the Dutch efforts to enforce EC border measures are no isolated instance, but part of a 
broader trend extending well beyond Europe. A recently finalized international agreement further 
regulates intellectual property rights at the borders. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
is a plurilateral treaty between Australia, Canada, the E.U., Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United States. While ACTA does not directly address 
patent infringement of generic drugs in transit, commentators believe that certain provisions do threaten 
the practice, and could eventually impede global access to medicines, as generic drugs would be subject 
to seizure on grounds of trademark and trade-dress infringement.41 
  
Following the same trend, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is under current negotiations between 
New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Brunei, the United States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Like 
ACTA’s, the negotiations of this treaty have been kept secret. The draft text leaked earlier this year by 
Knowledge Ecology International42 revealed that the agreement contains specific provisions regarding 
border measures that mirror the EU Regulation discussed above.43 These provisions would turn seizures 
of intransit merchandise into a standard action between TPP Member States, as long as there is any 
alleged intellectual property infringement.44 
  
These more recent international negotiations show that current instances of pharmaceutical patent 
enforcement against goods in transit point toward a broader future trend. Treaties such as these constrain 
national discretion and set a new standard of “minimum” intellectual property protection. Given the 
geographical location of all countries involved, they also pose new risks to legitimate global trade in 
generic medicines. It thus becomes increasingly important to confront the negative implications of this 
practice for the human right to health. 
  
International Trade and the Human Right of Access to Medicines 
The issue at stake before the WTO in the complaints lodged by India and Brazil is whether EU’s border 
measures are against free trade rules and principles, as this is the scope of the WTO’s regulation and 
assessment. Viewed solely in these terms, border enforcement of intellectual property laws is of 
questionable legality.45 An underlying issue, however, is the extent to which human rights 
considerations should inform international regulation on freedom of trade. Can the WTO recognize the 
significant threat to the human right to health posed by border patent enforcement, as grounding an 
international legal obligation in its own right? Or must the WTO proceed as if essential drugs were any 
other commodity, such as steel or cotton? Answering this question requires some nuance. 
  
In theory, international trade obligations and international human rights obligations are of equal standing 
in the law, neither definitively trumping the other.46 In practice, however, the two legal regimes are 
deeply incommensurate. International trade law has fundamentally pragmatic bases. On the level of 
principle it is committed to open trade, but this principle is subject to pervasive exceptions largely 
slanted in favor of the industrialized countries. The WTO system stops short of requiring truly free trade 
in agricultural commodities, and not only permits but mandates restrictions on trade designed to shore 
up intellectual property protection. Because the substance of international trade law is determined 
through a deeply political process, its enforcement stage is relatively less complicated. Effective 
international institutions exist to secure compliance with its terms and breaches of the rules are relatively 
rare. Human rights law, in contrast, is fundamentally concerned with the dignity of the individual. When 
interests conflict, this regime generally seeks its solutions through principled interpretation, rather than 
through political bargaining. Perhaps not surprisingly, the international institutions for human rights 
enforcement are relatively weak. 
  
The trade and human rights realms have encountered each other previously; the creation of the World 
Trade Organization was broadly criticized as undermining labor rights. The WTO’s IP provisions have 
also been contested by advocates of the right to health, who correctly identified the regime’s pursuit of 
global patent standards as a threat to access to medicines, particularly in the developing world.47 Many 
aspects of the WTO’s patent rules represent compromises that may be understood as grudging 
accommodations of public health demands. The WTO system does not, however, treat access to 
medicines as a human right. Promotion of health is considered as a domestic policy aim, rather than as 
an international legal obligation. Within WTO procedures, moreover, human rights claims do not 
provide a justification for failure to comply with trade rules. Arguments for human rights may only be 
used to help interpret ambiguous trade rules.48 
  
The dispute over border enforcement presents a new and different angle. As India and Brazil present the 
argument, the interests of free trade and of human rights in this instance are aligned: the European 
regulation aims to protect domestic companies from foreign competition through an interference in 
freedom of trade, which also happens to threaten public health. In theory, the WTO could take notice of 
the internationally recognized right to health as a relevant factor in interpreting whether border 
enforcement of patents violates international trade agreements. In practice, however, such a synthesis 
seems unlikely. The WTO is simply institutionally ill equipped to interpret and apply human rights 
concepts; its jurisdiction is restricted to the enforcement of trade agreements and its experts are trained 
and experienced in trade law, not human rights analysis.49 
  
Additionally, the international legal status of the human right to health is less clear than many other 
human rights. The right to health is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), but many countries, 
including the United States, are not parties to the latter convention. The European Convention on 
Human Rights does not recognize a right to health. The Charter of Fundamental Freedoms of the 
European Union contains a health provision that is significantly more modest compared to the ICESCR. 
Interpreting the human right to health in the context of any specific dispute also involves significant 
conceptual challenges.50 These legal and political complexities make it all the more likely that the WTO 
will choose not to directly address the right to health. 
  
India and Brazil are not obligated, however, to confine their complaints to the international trade system. 
Arguments from human rights would find a warmer reception in the international institutions 
specifically created to consider these issues, such as the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights or one of the regional human rights systems. Such venues offer powerful 
opportunities to publicize the human rights concerns raised by border enforcement of pharmaceutical 
patents. There are, however, challenges and limits to this approach. These human rights institutions are 
invested with dramatically less power than the trade institutions. For India and Brazil, a victory at the 
WTO will mean a change in European practice or at least, some form of compensation for India and 
Brazil. A victory in a human rights forum, in contrast, might not lead to a change in on-the-ground 
circumstances because of the weaker enforcement mechanisms of these institutions. 
  
Additionally, human rights law dominantly conceives of state responsibility in strongly territorial terms. 
It accounts for the possibility that the right to health of Brazilian citizens would be violated by actions of 
the Brazilian government. It has largely not struggled with the possibility that the right to health of 
Brazilian citizens would be violated by actions of European governments. The structures of human *203 
rights accountability are simply not designed to handle such external threats. Brazilian citizens harmed 
by interruption of their access to essential medicines may certainly appeal to the Brazilian court system 
or to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Neither of these institutions, however, has any 
authority to order a change in behavior on the part of European regulators. 
  
An appeal to the European Court of Human Rights stands a better chance of yielding an enforceable 
decision, in light of that institution’s jurisdiction over the relevant actors. Politically, however, this 
regime is beholden to European interests. This includes Europe’s increasing embrace of intellectual 
property protection as itself a human right.51 For instance, the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union provides that “Intellectual property shall be protected,” without acknowledging the 
tension between such protection and the enjoyment of other human rights.52 The construction of patent 
protection in human rights terms is deeply questionable from a doctrinal standpoint.53 Yet it poses a new 
hurdle for needy patients who would seek to challenge European measures against generic drugs in 
European courts. 
  
These dilemmas point to a need for new work in international law to address the problems posed by 
situations in which the realization and enjoyment of human rights is fundamentally dependent on 
freedom of international trade. Apart from the situation of access to medicines, topics such as food 
security and freedom of communication may also raise these issues. The seizure of generic drugs in 
transit through Europe may thus be a test case that gauges the ability of international human rights 
advocates and institutions to effectively respond to this unique form of threat to human rights. 
  
In confronting the immediate problem of border enforcement of pharmaceutical patents, the best chance 
of success will come from strategic use of multiple legal fora. The case of South African litigation 
surrounding generic production of antiretroviral medicines in 2001 can be particularly instructive. 
Because South Africa has a constitutional framework favorable to the right to health, public health 
advocates were able to use domestic litigation to publicly highlight the impact of TRIPS rules on human 
rights. This transnational legal strategy ultimately led to concessions in trade rules later negotiated at the 
WTO.54 Similarly, public health advocates today should not rely solely on proceedings at the WTO to 
challenge border enforcement of pharmaceutical patents. Proceedings in domestic and international fora 
that are more receptive to claims based on the right to health can help to politically frame the human 
impact of border enforcement. Even if these institutions lack the power to require European countries to 
abandon border enforcement, pronouncements condemning the practice as a violation of human rights 
would have significant symbolic value. In this way, parallel proceedings in human rights institutions, 
can ultimately put greater public pressure on European countries not to engage in tactics that threaten 
health, and influence the outcome in the WTO dispute resolution process. 
  
Conclusion 
Long hailed as a model for the developing world, Brazil’s public health system is under increasing 
financial pressure as new patent rules restrict its ability to use generic medicines. The newest challenge 
is border enforcement of European patents against pharmaceutical compounds in transshipment from 
India to other developing countries. This practice rests on dubious legal grounds, and is being 
challenged through the WTO dispute resolution process. Bringing a human rights perspective to bear on 
the issue, however, will require innovative advocacy beyond the confines of the World Trade 
Organization. More broadly, border seizures of generic drugs also point to the need for new work in 
international law addressing the problems faced where enjoyment of human rights depends on freedom 
of trade. 
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